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A Cross Cultural Analysis of Several 
Forms of Parenting 
Mother, Genitrix, and Mater 
MICHAEL R. HILL 
-- "The issue here is not so much technological as sociological." 
Herbert Brait, attorney 
-- "Even an infant needs her own space." 
Harvey Sorkow, judge 
Introduction 
Private Troubles and Public Issues 
Melissa Stern was born March 27, 1986, in New Jersey. For one so 
young, she has experienced or been the subject of interstate flight and 
fugitive hegira, legal battles involving her own court-appointed 
attorney, social controversy, the voracious attention of an insensitive 
media industry, and a place in history as the famous Baby "M". Judge 
Sorkow (1987: 26-27), in his opinion awarding custody of Melissa to 
her genetic father and terminating all parental rights of her genetic 
mother, notes professional evaluations indicating Melissa to be a "a 
mellow, alert, easy-to-care-for child who is blessed with a 'sunniness of 
disposition that is a delight to see. ' " She is also "a curious and social 
baby and adjusts to her strangers and social situtations easily." One 
hopes these resilient character traits flower as Melissa matures and 
discovers the intricacies in which her personal biography has become 
inextricably enmeshed in the public issues of American social conflict. 
The following analysis is offered with a view to explicating the 
interconnected personal troubles and public issues now drifting 
toward yet another reconsideration of a primary American social 
institution: family. This blatantly sociological enterprise has its own 
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role to serve in the reflexive and hopefully emancipatory hermeneutic 
of social change (Giddens, 1987a, 1987b), but it is also hoped that this 
analysis will at some future time make at least some sense to Melissa 
herself. 
Confronting distinctly personal troubles is by no means a unique 
experience in this society. Many of us, in the process of maturation, 
have acquired a substantial cache of guilty secrets, unresolved 
conflicts, desperate hopes, doubts, injustices, frustrations, betrayals, 
and stupidly bungled projects. We are often prime architects of our 
foibles, but at times we play the unwitting if not unwilling dupe to the 
deceptive fabrications, insanities, and insensitivities of friends and 
fellows who abuse our trust (Goffman, 1974/1986). These private 
troubles are the existential stuff of life in human society as it is now 
organized. Much that Melissa Stern has encountered and will continue 
to meet are personal troubles that only she can recognize, pick her way 
through, and presumably resolve with dignity and growth. 
Melissa's life journey began in the private troubles of her father, 
William Stern, and his wife, Elizabeth Stern. The Sterns wanted to 
raise a family (hardly a nefarious project in this intensely familistic 
society), but discovered that Elizabeth Stern's incipient (and hopefully 
mild) mUltiple sclerosis made pregnancy an unacceptable risk. 
Discouraged by their exploratory inquiries concerning adoption, the 
Sterns eventually learned about and investigated the possibility of 
surrogate reproduction. The consummation of a surrogate 
reproduction contract between William Stern, Mary Beth Whitehead, 
and her husband, Richard Whitehead, led to Mary Beth's artificial 
insemination with William's sperm and the subsequent birth of a baby 
girl, now known as Melissa Stern. As part of this arrangement, 
William agreed to pay $10,000 to Mary Beth who in turn agreed to 
sever her parental rights where the newborn baby was concerned. 
Had this plan gone as proposed (as hundreds of similar 
arrangements in fact have), Melissa's troubles would have been much 
reduced. Instead, Melissa's mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, became 
enmeshed in unforeseen personal troubles of her own. Among others, 
she decided to retain her parental rights and to raise the baby girl 
within her own family. These events set the stage for a deeply 
emotional drama in which two sets of legally incompatible personal 
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troubles, those of William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead, collided 
head on resulting in Melissa's well-chronicled odyssey. A vortex of 
personal troubles, claims and counterclaims ensued, entangling not 
only Melissa and her genetic parents, but also Elizabeth Stern, 
Richard Whitehead, the Whitehead's two children, Melissa's maternal 
grandparents, and friends of both families. Were this the full story, 
however, Harvey Sorkow's (1987) juridical resolution of these troubles 
would not have made front page headlines in national newspapers (see, 
for example, Hanley, 1987a, 1987b; New York Times, 1987; Shipp, 
1987). 
The private troubles of the assembled litigants and concerned 
parties became a catalyst wherein several public issues surfaced, 
became inflamed, and developed lives oftheir own which have nothing 
whatever to do with the happiness and well-being of Melissa, the little 
girl with the sunny disposition. Thus, we encounter here an unusually 
cataclysmic intersection of public issues and private troubles. Whereas 
Melissa must eventually come to grips with the notoriety of her own 
biography, she will do well to recognize that neither she nor her 
parents created the public issues that catapulted her into the history 
books. Her multiple parents only tried to resolve their own private 
troubles in their own ways. It was only later that they -- and the rest of 
us -- discovered that their private troubles were shared by many -- and 
could potentially be shared by a quite significant portion of our 
society. As Mills (1959) helps us understand, the personal troubles of 
the Sterns and the Whiteheads resonated in a loud, dissonant chorus 
echoing the public issues of a capitalist, patriarchal, and familistic 
society. 
Sociological Imagination and Family 
The myriad public issues finding voice in Judge Sorkow's New 
Jersey courtroom are rooted in our most enduring social patterns, 
including: family, law, religion, politics, partriarchy, racism, 
capitalism, and class. In this chapter, I concentrate on issues related to 
family. There is a tendency when investigating or thinking about 
matters related to these patterns to reify them, to conceptualize them 
as essentially immutable, fundamental, intrinsic, unquestionable. 
Understanding the actual map of our social world in this taken-for-
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granted, everday sense is in itself a tall and difficult project requiring 
intellectual discipline and sensitivity (Giddens, 1987a; Goffman, 
1974/1986; Deegan and Hill, 1987; Mead, 1934; Reinharz, 1979/1984; 
Rubin, 1976; Schutz, 1971; Taft, 1915/1987). Comprehending that our 
taken-for-granted institutions often assume radically different forms 
than posessed -- or recognized -- at present requires a degree of insight 
and reflexivity possessed by few people, including sociologists. With 
this in mind, Giddens (1978a, 1987b) argues for the practical necessity 
of adopting "the sociological imagination so eloquently outlined by 
the distinguished American sociologist, C. Wright Mills (1959). If we 
fail to critically examine history, anthropology, and alternative futur~s 
as Mills and Giddens advocate, we run the almost certain risk of 
entrapping ourselves in reifications, ethnocentrism, and political 
impotence. 
Most commentators agree that surrogate reproduction is intimately 
linked to the institution of "family". Failure to adopt historical and 
anthropological sensitivities, however, leads to strange, ethnocentric 
pronouncements about presumed universal aspects of family and 
parenting. Sensitive social scientists help us avoid such mistakes. Julia 
Kristeva (1974/1986), for example, provides a deep, texturally 
complex analysis of the meanings of motherhood and family in 
Chinese and western societies. Even within the restricted orbit of the 
industrialized countries of the contemporary world, however, history 
reveals a range of family forms and child rearing practices (Poster, 
1978) that would cause many narrow-minded, self-righteous defenders 
of mythically invariant family morality to retreat in embarrassment, 
hopefully with apologies for their insensitive bigotry. Jessie Bernard 
(1972/1982) demonstrated the surprisingly varied ways in which 
modern Americans arrange themselves in conjugal groupings of 
greater and lesser duration and commitment, including: traditional 
marriage, communes, cooperatives, one-night stands, swinging, 
intimate networks, households of unrelated individuals, serial 
polygamy, geriatric marriage, menage a trois, group marriage, 
companionate celibacy, and feminist households. Add to this list the 
variations devised by gays and lesbians and the permutations are 
formidable. Human beings invent, experiment, and adapt, often with 
vigor, grace, good humor and commitment. They also bungle, cheat, 
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and hurt each other, but this is not new. There are some who simply 
and unreflexively lump this diversity and playfulness under the rubric 
of "sin", but these are people who lack a sociological imagination -- to 
say the least. The best critical evidence leaves us with what is to some a 
startling conclusion: there is no such thing as the natural family form. 
We give life to many family forms, all as natural as the next, some 
enjoying greater or lesser popularity at different times and among 
various subgroups in western societies. 
The image of the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family 
(husband, wife, and their jointly produced genetic children) has been 
powerfully projected as the family as though this form is more 
"natural" or legitimate than any other possible arrangement. The 
reasons why this particular familial pattern has received massive 
ideological approval in American society lie beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but interested readers will find a good introduction to several 
fundamental public issues in Barrett and McIntosh (1982). The point 
here is that discussions of surrogate reproduction get caught in 
needlessly convoluted distortions and serious conceptual mistakes if 
their authors assume from the outset that there is really only one kind 
of legitimate and natural family form. 
Multiple Parenting 
A cross-cultural perspective on the forms of parenthood lets Melissa 
Stern rationally locate herself in a matrix of mUltiple parents. On 
examination, we see that multiple parentage is quite common, even 
among families who believe themselves to be model examples of the 
independent conjugal nuclear type. The possibilities for mUltiple 
parenting are not new, but they have been augmented by recent 
developments in bio-techno-medical research (cryrogenics, gene 
splitting, in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, especially). One 
thing needs to be said, however: that the surrogate reproductive 
procedures (artificial insemination) resulting ultimately in Melissa's 
birth are exceptionally low-tech and do not depend intrinsically on 
medical intervention. Indeed, were it not for the cultural mores of the 
reproductive partners in surrogacy arrangements, impregnation could 
be readily achieved through normal coition. Whereas genuine and 
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serious concerns are raised by the high-tech reproductive technologies, 
these concerns, insofar as they are generated by technology per se, do 
not apply to surrogate reproduction ofthe type which brought Melissa 
into this world. 
Given the disparate variations in marriage and parenting found 
trans-historically worldwide, it makes sense anthropologically to 
speak of forms of parenthood. These general patterns, three each for 
mothers and fathers, are outlined in Table 1. Theforms offatherhood, 
for example, can all be filled by one person. This result is assumed in 
the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family. The husband is the 
genetic father. As genitor, he nurtures and sustains his wife during her 
pregnancy. Finally, in the role of pater, he helps rear and socialize the 
young child. Thus, if we mistakenly assume that the independent 
conjugal nuclear family is the only natural family form, we are likely to 
erroneously conflate the various forms of fatherhood. 
If we take a broad view, as the sociological imagination suggests we 
should, we find that fatherhood roles in some cultures are distributed 
over a large number of people. While only one male can technically be 
the genetic father, some biologically naive and promiscuous groups 
believe and act upon the idea that it is possible for a woman to be the 
genetic father. Sustenance during pregnancy can be accomplished by 
several males, and is sometimes required in a somewhat unusual-- to 
contemporary occidental ears -- variation in societies where it is 
believed that the fetus will grow only if the mother has coitus on a 
frequent basis with several males during pregnancy. The presumption 
is that the seminal fluid nourishes the fetus. It is this relatively rare 
belief and practice from which the term "genitor" derives, but support 
of the mother and her fetus certainly includes many possibilities other 
than coital service. Additional forms of nurture can be easily identified 
and provided by a wide range of persons. These include emotional 
resources, financial aid, medical assistance, and birthing preparation. 
Finally, following the child's nativity, the newborn may be raised by 
yet another father, or even by a group of men who share equally or 
hierarchically in the pater role. 
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TABLE 1: Forms of Parenthood 
MALE 
Genetic Father 
(contributes sperm) 
Genitor 
(provides supportive 
environment for 
pregnant 
genitrix) 
Pater 
(provides care and 
socialization of child 
FEMALE 
Genetic Mother 
(contributes egg) 
Genitrix 
(provides gestation 
and/ or supportive 
environment for 
pregnant genitrix) 
Mater 
**** 
(provides care and 
socialization of child) 
By analogy, a similar analysis is possible for motherhood. The roles 
of genetic mother, genitrix, and mater are all filled by the wife in the 
"ideal" conjugal nuclear family. In vitro fertilization, however, makes 
it possible to clearly separate these three roles. For example, an egg 
supplied by one woman (genetic mother) is fertilized and implanted in 
a second (genitrix), with the resulting child raised by a third (mater). 
These roles are also open to cooperative arrangements. For example, 
nurturing a pregnant woman can be shared, thus expanding the role of 
genitrix to non-pregnant but supportiye women. Finally, any number 
of women can be designated or seek to be maters, taking responsibility 
for the care and socialization of the newborn. 
Looking at parenthood in this way absolves Melissa from 
unnecessary confusion and fruitless questions such as "Who are my 
real parents?" In reality, she has mUltiple parents who have clearly 
identifiable roles, all essential to Melissa's conception, gestation, birth, 
and subsequent well being. All her parents have made real 
contributions. One the male side, her genetic father is William Stern, 
her genitors are William Stern (who paid the medical bills) and 
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Richard Whitehead (who saw his wife through her pregnancy), and her 
pater is now William Stern (assuming that Judge Sorkow's custody 
decision is not reversed or significantly modified). On the female side, 
her genetic mother and genitrix is Mary Beth Whitehead. The court 
record indicates that Elizabeth Stern, herself a physician, participated 
in an ancillary genitrix role by giving emotional reinforcement and 
medical advice. Her primary mater will be Elizabeth Stern (and may 
include Mary Beth Whitehead in a secondary mater role if subsequent 
courts allow visitation). This accounting of Melissa's various parents 
appears bizarre only if one applies the unique and anthropologically 
strange case of the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family as 
one's point of reference. 
In fact, such mUltiple parent situations are not at all unusual. They 
are commonly found in families involving death of a spouse and 
subsequent remarriage by the survivor; in families dissolved and 
reassembled through the increasingly common practice of serial 
polygamy; and in families formed by adoption and foster parenting. 
Surrogate reproduction adds no new twists to parenting roles already 
in place and socially accepted. 
Parenting: Ideology' and Praxis 
Our concepts of family and parenthood are changing, but 
sometimes we let obvious, easily assimilated changes slip away 
unnoticed when our rhetoric becomes intemperate and ethnocentric. 
We forget that the "ideal" independent conjugal nuclear family is, in 
fact, far from common in practice when we look closely at the 
parenting roles in American society. With high rates of teenage 
promiscuity and pregnancy, not to mention multiple-partner sexual 
liasons among adults both married and single, it is reasonable to 
conclude that in significantly increasing number of pregnancies there 
is no congruence between the genetic father and the genitor/pater in 
many so-called "ideal" marriages. Without a court test and paternity 
evidence provided to the contrary, the vast majority in this society are 
quite happy to assume and act as though the husband in a conjugal 
nuclear family is necessarily the genetic father of his children, even 
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when a quick calculation of the odds could easily lead to alternate 
conclusions. 
When we reflect comprehensively on the ways in which parenting 
roles are currently distributed in American society, the ideological 
hypocrisy that conflates parenting praxis with the "ideal" 
independent conjugal nuclear family quickly crumbles. For example, 
participants in popular prenatal birthing programs often utilize 
someone other than the genetic father to fill the genitor / genetrix role 
as "coach" for breathing exercises. Courts appoint guardians to 
represent the interests of unborn children, a legal institutionalization 
of the genitor / genitrix role. Many children find themselves paired to 
mUltiple maters and paters (and fictive kin) through the widespread 
practice of appointing godparents in religious rituals. I leave 
untouched the various roles adopted by grandparents, some having 
sued successfully in court to establish visitation with their 
grandchildren. 
Bitterly contested custody suits attending divorce create 
unfortunate acrimony and sorrow, but reasonably amicable custody 
resolutions appear much more the norm. Our society is readily and 
easily legitimating remarriages wherein wives and husbands frequently 
become maters and paters to children where others (often faceless 
unknowns, sometimes not) fulfilled the role of genetic parent as well as 
genitor or genitrix. The growing number of single parent families (of 
several types) calls for a pragmatic redefinition of "family" and 
parenting roles. This call is increasingly hard to ignore. Expanding day 
care service widens opportunities for more men and women of the 
community to participate in the pater and mater role (in addition to 
traditional pater/mater niches such as school teaching, scout 
leadership, and Big Brother/ Big Sister programs). We must account 
also for the in loco parentis responsibilities of boarding schools and 
colleges, the roles of nannies, wetnurses, baby sitters, and others who 
act as mater and pater on intermittant as well as regular bases. In short, 
although the concept of parenthood in this society is frequently 
conflated with the ideological ideal of the independent conjugal 
nuclear family, we generally act quite differently, routinely splitting 
parenthood roles and assigning their performance to a surprisingly 
wide variety of individuals. There is a conceptual gap between what we 
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say we believe parenthood to be and what we actually take-for-granted 
and act upon where parenting is concerned. 
There are some who would blindly ban the distribution of parenting 
roles that accompany surrogate reproduction. Such proposals are 
authored by unthinking critics who do not see that precisely the same 
distributions can be accomplished by misadventure using fully 
legitimated routes. Consider this hypothetical example: A man and 
woman marry, but subsequently discover that the woman cannot have 
children. Family, friends, and neighbors whisper in guarded tones, 
"My, my what a shame, he would make such a good father." The 
couple tries to redefine their childlessness as a positive opportunity for 
interpersonal growth, but they are told they are "selfish" to think that 
way. Family and friends, however, continually remind the couple of 
their "disappointment" and "tragedy". Succumbing to self-doubt and 
other pressures, the marriage ends as the couple is unable to 
conceptualize a meaningful future. The man quickly remarries, but not 
wisely. A child is born of this new union, a child who almost 
immediately becomes the subject of a bitter custody challenge and the 
center of rancorous divorce proceedings in which the man eventually 
agrees to pay $10,000 in alimony as a move to "get his manipulative 
new wife off his back." In light of documented circumstances which 
throw reasonable doubt on the ability of the mother to provide a 
nurturant and stable home, the court awards custody ofthe child to the 
man, a not uncommon event in this day and age. Time passes. 
Eventually, the man and his first wife begin dating again and discover 
to their mutual delight that they hadn't really given marriage a chance. 
They remarry and the woman eventually adopts the child as her own. 
Were this a movie script, would we not feel pangs of sympathy, at least 
for the child who has found a happy home in the midst of an otherwise 
troubled and imperfect world? I think so. And if we can, then I think 
we can feel ever so much better about Melissa and her new life with the 
Sterns, a life that the Sterns wanted, planned, and presumably prayed 
for. 
I do not assert that the above hypothetical case and the surrogate 
reproduction arrangement entered by William Stern and the 
Whiteheads are in any way similar in terms of intent. But, I do argue 
that the resulting parenthood roles and many of the structural 
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conditions are remarkably congruent. Society already provides a fully 
legitimated sequence of events that has much the same result as 
surrogate reproduction by simply resorting to a variation on serial 
polygamy. Indeed, were surrogate reproduction to be outlawed, as 
some propose, I suspect it would not be long before persons would 
collude to purposefully implement a moderately complicated three-
stage scenario (marriage-divorce / second marriage-pregnancy-divorce-
custody & alimony settlement/ remarriage-adoption) in much the 
same way that many couples a few years ago routinely divorced and 
remarried annually in order to gain federal tax benefits based on 
marital status. Human beings are remarkably inventive and 
resourceful when push come to shove. It is mistaken to think that 
simply outlawing a practice means, in our insititutionally redundant 
bureaucratic society, that it cannot be accomplished legally by other 
fully legitimate, socially acceptable procedures. 
Legislation and Emancipatory Futures 
It is wise to be wary when male-dominated legal, medical, and 
political professions dip their collective hands in any till where large 
sums of public and private funds are freely flowing and the interests of 
newborn babies are at stake. With regard to surrogacy, thoughtful 
people have raised several issues of concern (see, for example, Brail, 
1987; Harvard Law Review, 1986; Hollinger, 1985; Katz, 1986; 
Mellown, 1985; Sorkow, 1987), but most nonetheless see a role for 
surrogacy in specifiable circumstances. Avi Katz (1986), for example, 
in a paper awarded the Columbia Law Women's Association Prize, 
meticulously puts to rest the false equation of surrogacy with baby 
selling and reviews the efficacy of various approaches to surrogacy 
legislation. These analysts are of one voice in calling for legislative 
guidance to institutionalize equity for all parties involved in surrogate 
reproduction. 
Writing and enacting legislation is a social project, one which 
defines, enables, and limits human action. Present laws become 
frameworks within future humans (some like ourselves, and some no 
doubt quite different - at least in their values) will reproduce, raise 
families, and even marry. Thoughtful legislation in a democratic 
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society creates opportumties for emancipatory alternative futures 
which may be at present beyond our ken. Articulating such futures is 
one of the main tasks of sociology (Giddens, 1987a, 1987b; Hill, 1984; 
Mills, 1959). These futures are the critical and political produce of 
active sociological imagination. 
Caution is advised such that we do not ethnocentrically, too quickly, 
or unnecessarily, bar socially and personally beneficial avenues to life, 
liberty, and happiness. Legislative action requires anthropological, 
historical, and critical sensibilites in order to strike an 
equitable and emancipatory balance between public policies and 
personal interests. Emancipatory social consciousness calls forth self-
determination, mutual understanding and public cooperation (Mead, 
1934; Taft, 1915/1987). I hope these goals will be uppermost in the 
minds of legislators who draft and vote on bills designed to regulate 
surrogacy. Legislation encouraging cooperative social consciousness 
and structurally supporting its realization can only be applauded. It is 
certain that surrogacy statutes will be enacted. I urge here that, 
whatever else is accomplished by codification, we not run roughshod 
over the emancipatory potentials called forth by hundreds of people 
who, in resolving their private troubles, have given life to surrogacy as 
a focus of public issues. At the least, these issues include the following: 
upward mobility, feminist sisterhood, inter-class solidarity, ethnic and 
communal legacies, and renewed sensitivity to the needs and status of 
orphans. 
Upward Mobility: Much has been made in sensational popular 
accounts concerning the relatively large, lump-sum fees paid to 
surrogate mothers. Before uncritically dismissing these payments to 
the genetic mother / genitrix as exploitive, there is another dimension 
to be explored, one in which these sums play an enabling,constructive, 
emancipatory role. Opportunities for working-class women to gather 
substantial sums of money at one place within a constrained time 
period in this society are virtually non-existent. Critics who would bar 
these women and their families from financial resources that could 
easily purchase a major life-dream (a habitable home, needed surgery, 
a child's college education, and so on), should more closely examine 
their own class biases. A careful reading of Rubin's (1976) brilliant 
exploration oflife in working-class families will help sensitize even the 
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most complacent middle-class pundit. If we are serious about class 
leveling and upward mobility, then we should be cautious about 
shutting the door on equitably reimbursed surrogacy arrangements 
between freely consenting parties. 
I do not know what the Whiteheads plan to do with the surrogacy 
fee paid by the Sterns, that is their own private trouble. Given the 
special origin of the money, attendant as it is on Melissa's birth, one 
hopes it might be dedicated to a constructive project found especially 
meaningful by the Whiteheads. Melissa Stern should be encouraged to 
feel joy insofar as the familial desire that brought her into this world 
not only gave delight to William and Elizabeth Stern but also resulted 
in a rare, beneficent material opportunity for the family of Mary Beth 
and Richard Whitehead. 
Sad to say, a professor I know recently expounded venomously that, 
"Surrogate mothers only want to see their babies grow up in 
comfortable upper middle-class home!" Presumably, I and others in 
his audience were supposed to think this goal unconscionable. A black 
woman sitting nearby was heard to say in a loud stage whisper, "It sure 
beats living in the ghetto!" I concur. Families, with full social 
approval, have long used marriage as a mechanism for upward 
mobility. Impoverished mothers have routinely given up their genetic 
children to adopting maters and paters, "So the kids could have 
a better chance at life." To impugn identical motivations when they 
surface in the hearts of mUltiple parents freely engaged in surrogate 
reproduction is not equitable. That we have such gross material 
inequality, that is the unconscionable reality, one that is a genuine 
public issue (Scott, 1984). Given that barbarous inequality is the order 
of the day, can we blame people who want something better for their 
genetic offspring, if not for themselves? The prospects for Melissa's 
material future seem especially bright. Whatever her other personal 
troubles, financial want is not likely to be among them. I doubt she will 
begrudge this fact in the years to come. 
Feminist Sisterhood: Volumes of journals, pamphlets, and 
responsible treatises call women worldwide to unite in sisterhood and 
mutual support. This call is a creative response to a public issue: the 
iron grip of patriarchy on our institutional structures. Many women 
who have served as surrogate mothers report their extraordinary 
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pleasure at being able to form a bond with a woman who desires but 
otherwise could not have children, giving her the inestimable gift of a 
young infant. The potential for building and repeating such bonds in a 
growing woman-to-woman network of love and affection between 
genetic mothers, genetrix, and maters, calls for our encouragement 
when amicable parties are willing and competent to join in this way. 
Surrogacy is by no means the only or even a central basis for feminist 
solidarity, but neither is it reprehensible nor deserving of degrading 
epithets (i.e., mother machines, cows, breeders, baby sellers, etc.). 
It is unfortunate that society did not stand ready to help Mary Beth 
Whitehead and Elizabeth Stern preserve the bonds they began to 
establish but which shattered in the heat of personal troubles writ large 
in public courtroom litigation. Our patriarchal society is notoriously 
intolerant of feminism. The structure of law in this case exacerbates 
the personal troubles of Mary Beth and Elizabeth, artificially pitting 
them in adversarial opposition rather than calling forth their mutual 
interests as mUltiple parents. 
Critics should note that most surrogate reproduction agreements 
between mUltiple parents do not land in court, even in the absence of 
equity establishing legislation. Indeed, it is the parties to traditional 
conjugal nuclear marriages who find themselves in court with 
considerably greater frequency arguing over the best interests of their 
children. I suspect that the astoundingly quiet consummation and 
fulfillment of nearly all other mUltiple parenting arrangements 
effected through surrogacy draws deeply on real bonds of sisterhood 
for success, strength, and meaning. We must be careful not to foil this 
potential for feminist bonding. 
In the case at hand, Melissa will do well to understand that it was 
unusual for sisterhood to collapse, for her mater to be selected 
juridically (Judge Sorkow arranged for Elizabeth Stern to sign 
adoption papers immediately following the reading of his custody 
decision). Reading his opinion, hopefully Melissa will grant Judge 
Sorkow now only wisdom but also the latitude for fallibility we all 
need when making difficult decisions based on necessarily limited 
data. In the mature resolution of her own personal troubles, Melissa 
may find the strength, insight, and inclination to mend the broken 
bonds of sisterhood between her genetic mother / genetrix and her 
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mater. Melissa did not cause these bonds to break and it is not her 
responsibility to call forth conciliation, but we can give her every 
support if she should be so spunky as to try. If she does, she should 
realize, however, that a long history of patriarchal patterns is stacked 
against her. 
Inter-Class Solidarity: The potential for feminist bonding parallels 
a novel opening for solidarity between economist classes based on 
shared interests in children. Critics have correctly noted that present 
surrogacy arrangements are asymmetrical: the surrogate mother is 
almost invariably of lower class standing than the genetic father. None 
that I know of however, have argued for mechanisms that could 
restore the balance somewhat, such as charitable foundations who 
could fund surrogacy reproduction when the participants involved 
could not afford it. Indeed, a portion of the fees now going to attorneys 
could be legislatively diverted to capitalize this proposed foundation. 
Short of such funding, however, other opportunities for improved 
inter-class relations based on surrogate reproduction and multiple 
parenting should not be ignored. For example, the Sterns agreed to 
provide Mary Beth Whitehead with "an annual picture and letter 
report of progress" detailing Melissa's development (Sorkow, 
1987:31). This minimal communication is more significant and 
interpersonally meaningful than generally occurs between most upper 
middle-class and working-class families. 
Giddens (1981) convincingly shows that class relations in 
industrialized societies are far more complexly textured than 
orthodox marxists (or most of the more conservative sociologists, for 
that matter) are willing to grant. Recognizing and acting on class 
complexity is a public issue which to date has received little if any 
legislative consideration. We now have an opportunity for action. The 
many-faceted matrix of class/ parent relationships theoretically 
possible in multiple parenthood echoes Gidden's account of class as a 
variegated social phenomenon. Surrogate reproduction agreements, 
however, move concretely, enacting these possibilities in reality, 
giving birth to a new form of complex inter-class relation based in 
mUltiple parenthood roles. This new inter-class relation provides a 
structure - and well-being of multiple-parented children provides 
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motivation -- for calling forth deep mutual understanding across class 
lines. This opportunity, as a public issue, should not be lightly rejected. 
Ethnic Heritage and Communal Legacies: Melissa also carries 
forward, through her genetic makeup and socialization by her pater, 
William Stern, a very special legacy that rises from the ashes of World 
War II. In examining the actual features of Melissa's biography, it is 
sobering to realize that shortly after Elizabeth Stern learned in late 
1979 that she had mUltiple sclerosis and should avoid pregnancy, 
William Stern became the last surviving member of all branches of his 
family to escape the Nazi Holocaust when his mother died in 1983 
(Brail, 1987; Sorkow, 1987). While some critics condemn the 
presumed egocentric biological snobbery of men who use 
extraordinary means to become genetic fathers, such condemnation is 
wholly unpardonable and insensitive in this case. It is hard to 
underestimate or feel unsympathetic to the significance William Stern 
was entitled to place on becoming a genetic father given the 
intersection of his personal biography with the public issue of 
genocide. Melissa's inheritance is not simply genetic, it is communal, 
religious, historic. She has received a special legacy to treasure. To 
infer otherwise, even remotely, commits a most reprehensible act of 
anti-semitism and is an immense disservice to William Stern. We 
should turn with welcome to the emancipatory possibilities created by 
surrogacy for preserving ethnic and communal identities threatened 
with extinction. 
Orphans Reconsidered: Finally, critics have argued vehemently 
that surrogacy is a slap in the face to orphaned children who have not 
been, and may never be adopted. Mellown (1985) makes this case more 
cogently than most. The essence of the argument is that surrogacy 
should not be permitted unless adoptable children are first placed in 
loving and supportive homes. There are several problems with this 
reasoning, although Mellown's sympathies are clearly admirable. 
First, an assumption is made that life in orphanages or with foster 
parents is necessarily injurious and unsatisfactory. In fact, many such 
settings are far safer and more nurturant than many so-called 
"normal" homes which continue to spawn nightmarish public records 
of child neglect, abuse, and injury. Second, many institutionalized 
children have serious problems requiring the specialized attention of a 
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trained, resident staff. Third, while the adoption drought may not be 
quite so serious as Judge Sorkow (1987) painted it, it is still severe. 
Fourth, critics should note that adoption procedures are also class 
biased in invidious ways. Members of the middle class much more 
easily demonstrate the characteristics deemed appropriate during 
screening by adoption agency personnel. Finally, if there is a major 
group of competent, healthy children who really need homes (an 
unanalyzed and untested assumption at this point), this is a public 
issue in its own right. It is not solved by banning surrogacy. Childless 
couples should not be held anymore responsible than anyone else for 
providing homes for children who lack adequate maters and paters. 
Childless persons should be asked to do no more than to share 
equitably in a scheme that distributes adoptable children to maters and 
paters across the board. 
An unnecessary private trouble is thrust on Melissa by writers who 
conflate the issues of surrogacy and adoption. Melissa must not be 
given any reason to think that she might be "taking someone else's 
place" anymore than is the proverbial kid next door. Nor should 
youngsters with institutionalized, non-familial maters and paters be 
encouraged to think their lives diminished or degraded by the fact of 
Melissa's or anyone else's existence. At the same time, if surrogacy 
serves as a catalyst for rethinking our adoption/ orphanage situation 
and related public policies, so much the better. This, too, is a positive 
and potentially emancipatory outcome. 
Conclusion: Space for Melissa Stern 
Scurrilous commentators wrongly impugn not only the motives of 
the Whiteheads and the Sterns, but also denigrate the morality, sanity, 
and civic responsibility of any person who dares enter a surrogate 
reproduction agreement (for especially vituperative examples, see 
Corea, 1985: 213-249; and Pollitt, 1987). I believe the language and 
derogatory labeling used in these pseudo-rational accounts is harmful, 
not only to mUltiple parents and children generally, but in this specific 
case to the Whiteheads, the Sterns, and especially to Melissa. 
Elsewhere, I call attacks of this type a form of 
"intellectual violence" which hurts rather than emancipates (Hill, 
1985). We must be more careful to comment on public issues in ways 
that separate public concerns from private troubles. We do well to 
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keep in mind that real people will read privately what we write in 
pUblic. 
Charges of criminal baby selling, class exploitation, sexism, 
unconscionable selfishness, and biological bigotry have issued from 
journalists (some even claiming - falsely - to be feminist) who write 
about surrogate parenting. If such charges were true and tied 
intrinsically to surrogate reproduction per se in especially 
destructive ways, then it might be justified to heap injury, reproach, 
and opprobrium upon private people who want nothing more radical 
than to have babies and rear families. Considered reflection suggests, 
however, that these charges are not true, nor are they problems unique 
or intrinsic to surrogate reproduction. Persons interested seriously 
in Melissa Stern's legal and social history are well advised to read the 
full text of Judge Sorkow's (1987) decision. In it, one finds the 
surrogacy is not the focal point ofthe case. Rather, it is Melissa Stern, 
her needs, her dependencies, her future. Baby "M" is not a symbol for 
abstracted social causes, it is a pseudonym of an actual person who will 
laugh, play, cry, and grow to maturity in our communal midst. As 
fellow humans, it is our job to support her as we can. As a sociologist, I 
have tried to explain for her that she is not a freak and that her parents 
are not ogres, that neither she nor her parents are in any way 
responsible for the storm of controversy, charges and counter charges 
that greeted her birth. As with any life, Melissa's is worth celebrating 
and protecting. I am moved by Judge Sorkow's (1987: 121) closing 
comment: 
Melissa needs stability and peace, so that she can be nurtured 
in a loving environment free from chaos and sheltered from the 
public eye. 
I really do not know why persons want to become parents, it seems 
such a lot of work, worry, and - often as not - disappointment and 
heartache. On the other hand, neither do I know why some among us 
are so bent on viciously punishing those who would move mountains 
to become parents. I suspect a long, repressive, right-wing hidden 
agenda motivates these intolerant hacks, but an explication of my 
suspicions would take us well beyond the scope of this chapter. What I 
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do know is that we must all apparently remind ourselves that we are 
talking about real parents, real babies, and real futures. We could do 
much worse than heed Judge Sorkow's closing admonition. 
The facts attending Melissa Stern's arrival in the human community 
instructively demonstrate the unfolding of personal biography in the 
context of social institutions, the weaving of distinctive tapestries with 
private woof and public warp. The sociological imagination expands 
our ability to understand and comprehend these interlacing 
patterns, to rescue family and parenthood from myopic, hypocritical 
conflation, to explore the vitality and variety of human invention. 
Human society is not fixed, but experimental, malleable by self-
determined citizens working with mutual understanding to reach 
widespread social cooperation. Melissa Stern has already given us a 
great gift, an opportunity to celebrate her life by seeking emancipatory 
futures for us all. In return, we can give Melissa the gift of privacy, 
peace, and freedom - a space of her own. 
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